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attention-seeking activities are shown. At the normative level, the issues of welfare, efficiency and
optimal policy interventions are addressed.
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21. Introduction
Economics deals with the allocation of a scarce resource on a set of alternatives.
The prerequisite for choice between different alternatives is possession of informa-
tion about the set of items between which one can choose. Lack of information may
lead to consumer ignorance with regard to possible alternatives. Firms can reduce
this problem by providing information, in the sense that they alert consumers to
the existence of goods. This was pointed out in the so-called informative view of
advertising (see, e.g., Stigler, 1961). The modern consumer may experience a differ-
ent problem – a mail box full of advertisements for diverse items jostling for his or
her attention. As Herbert Simon pointed out, a rich supply of information renders
attention a scarce economic factor. Information “consumes the attention of its recip-
ients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” (Simon, 1971,
p. 40). This paper presents an equilibrium model in which consumers have a limited
amount of attention and in which firms compete for this limited resource. It iden-
tifies the psychological and technological conditions that create an information-rich
economy, where consumer attention is scarce, as opposed to an information-poor
economy, where consumers lack information on the existence of products.
The point of departure for the analysis are some basic facts regarding limited atten-
tion. Behaviour is contingent on perception – irrespective of the degree of rationality
of subjects. People have a limited capacity to process signals, and only signals that
are sufficiently intense are perceived. One purpose of this paper is to integrate basic
empirical facts from the psychology of attention (see Pashler, 1998 for a survey) into
a consumer model that is simple enough to be used in comparative-static equilib-
3rium analysis. In an information-poor economy, consumers still have free capacity,
so that any product brought to their attention will be part of the choice set on which
they will spend their budget. By contrast, if the attention capacity of consumers
has been largely used up, then firms have to compete for scarce consumer attention
in order to sell their products, and this competition may be quite fierce. People tend
to pay attention to salient locations, for instance, to the first items displayed by an
Internet search engine.1 Only those firms that succeed in entering into the buyers’
field of attention participate in the market.
For a formal analysis of the role of limited attention, the paper proposes a two-
stage competitive equilibrium model. Individual consumers and firms have zero
mass. In the first stage, firms compete for the attention of consumers by send-
ing signals. In the second stage, those firms that succeed in attracting attention
compete for the budget of consumers in a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
competition framework.2 There is no heterogeneity among firms or consumers and
all outcomes are symmetric. In addition to preferences, budgets and production
technology, the exogenous fundamentals are the consumers’ attention capacity and
the firms’ information technology. The latter comprises two components: the cost
structure of generating and distributing signals to consumers, and the range, that
is, the size of consumer audiences that can be reached. Whether consumer attention
1User patterns on the Internet show a highly skewed distribution concentrated on relatively few
sources of information. See Hubermann (2001) for a survey on power laws in the web.
2Falkinger (2007) analysed the general mathematical structure of the interaction of zero-mass
senders and receivers, allowing for heterogeneity of agents. There, however, scarcity of attention
is imposed by assumption and the benefit of attracting attention is exogenously given without
modelling economic competition. By contrast, this paper considers a concrete psychological and
economic structure that analyses competition for attention and conventional economic competi-
tion simultaneously and that determines endogenously whether an economy is information rich or
information poor.
4is scarce or not depends on consumers’ attention capacity, but also on the volume
of attention-seeking signals sent by firms. Whereas consumers’ attention capacity is
considered an exogenous psychological characteristic in this paper, the exposure of
consumers to attention-seeking signals is endogenous. It increases as the diversity
of products and the signal strength per product increase. The comparative-static
equilibrium analysis shows the effects of information technology, consumer income,
market size and media on the level of attention-seeking activities carried out by firms
and on the diversity of products in the economy. An analysis of welfare confirms
that moving from an information-poor to an information-rich economy is beneficial
for consumers because they can then choose from a larger diversity of goods. How-
ever, because consumers’ attention capacity is fully occupied in an information-rich
economy, this type of economy also exhibits wasteful competition for attention in
the sense of an inefficient amount of attention-seeking on the part of firms. The
model can be extended to incorporate the possible effects of competition for atten-
tion on the preferences of consumers, as suggested by the so-called persuasive view
of advertising (advanced, e.g., by Kaldor, 1950–51).3 In equilibrium, such effects
can imply a rise in price-cost margins, a shift of resources towards industries prone
to intense attention-seeking, or an increasing orientation towards consumption and
work among individuals.
The psychology of attention differentiates between endogenous (voluntary) and ex-
ogenous (involuntary/automatic) control. In Kahneman’s (1973) words, voluntary
attention means that “the subject attends to stimuli because they are relevant to
a task that he has chosen to perform” (p. 4), whereas involuntary attention is
3See Bagwell (forthcoming) for a comprehensive survey on the economics of advertising.
5related to level of arousal, which “is largely controlled by the properties of the stim-
uli to which the organism is exposed” (p. 3). In recent years, several economists
have addressed the problem of limited attention,4 which Camerer (2003) listed as
one of the more important topics in behavioural economics. These studies focus
on information-processing by the receivers of information (consumers) and shed
light on the issue of goal-driven voluntary attention allocation. For instance, how
do boundedly rational individuals allocate a given time budget for the acquisi-
tion of information from different sources (Gabaix et al. (2003, 2006))? Which
parts of macroeconomic data should rational agents evaluate if limited information-
processing capacity forces them to discard part of the data (Sims, 2003)? How often
do inattentive producers or consumers update their information for adjusting prices
or savings plans (Reis, 2006 a,b)? My own contribution complements these studies
by focussing on the role of attention-seekers (the firms) and their competition for
attention. Consumers process information automatically. They dedicate their at-
tention capacity to the “strongest” signals. Such an approach shifts the object of
interest from the details of information-processing to those of the supply of infor-
mation. How “strongly” must an information source send its signal in order to have
impact? How many different sources will be perceived (equilibrium diversity) if all of
them compete for attention by sending the message “Look at me!”? Incorporating
4Authors from other scientific fields have also begun to study the consequences of limited
attention. For instance, an account of the art of gaining attention in scientific publishing is given
by Klamer and van Dalen (2002). Davenport and Beck (2001) look at attention from the perspective
of business economics. Shapiro and Varian (1999) also discuss business strategies for attracting
attention. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) analyse the implications of investors’ limited attention for
firms’ information policy and financial market equilibrium. Dukas (2004) reviews the evolutionary
roots of limited attention and its role in the fitness of animals. Finally, the most salient evidence
of a new and severe problem of information congestion – the flood of spam on the Internet –
has induced computer scientists to investigate the “market for attention”. One of the ideas is to
implement such a market in a quite conventional way by charging postage for email. Kraut et al.
(2002) carried out preliminary laboratory experiments on the effectiveness of such proposals.
6goal-oriented information-processing by consumers would increase the complexity
of the analysis substantially. However, I do not believe this would contribute in a
systematic way to the main questions addressed in this paper, namely: What deter-
mines whether or not attention is scarce in equilibrium? How do these determinants
affect equilibrium diversity and the amount that an average firm spends in equilib-
rium on attention-seeking activities?
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 presents a simple model
of limited consumer attention. Section 3 describes the competition of firms for the
attention of consumers as well as their competition for the budget of consumers
whose attention has been attracted. In Section 4, the characteristics of equilibrium
are described and an explicit criterion is established for determining whether an
economy is information rich or information poor. Equilibrium diversity of products
and firms and equilibrium level of attention-seeking activities are derived for the
information-poor and information-rich regimes, respectively. In Section 5, the eco-
nomic causes of attention scarcity and its implications are identified on the basis of
a comparative-static equilibrium analysis. Moreover, media-intermediated competi-
tion for attention is considered. Section 6 deals with the normative aspects of the
competition for attention – welfare, efficiency and the new policy measures required
in an information-rich economy. Section 7 summarises the main results and also
discusses extensions to the model that would account for the further psychological
effects on consumers of intensified attention-seeking by firms. Proofs are provided
in the appendix.
72. Limited Attention
Psychological research has identified two basic aspects in human information-pro-
cessing: (i) the selection of the set of items to be processed according to a filter
or gating mechanism, and (ii) the processing of the selected items by allocating
limited mental resources to them. Pashler (1998) summarises the empirical evi-
dence obtained in attention psychology research under the term “controlled parallel
processing”, asserting that “capacity limits and perceptual gating both character-
ize human perceptual processing” (p. 224, Pashler’s emphasis). According to this
author, many controversies in psychology research result from the fact that some re-
searchers identify the concept of attention with the allocation of a limited processing
capacity to a given set of items, while others relate attention to the selection of this
set by a gating mechanism. The gating mechanism implies that mental resources
are allocated only to those items that have passed the perceptual filter, while the
rest is ignored. Applied to consumer behaviour, this means that only goods that
pass the perceptual filter are members of the choice set evaluated by the consumer.
Thus, the gating mechanism is the fundamental hurdle for a firm trying to attract
consumers. The following analysis focuses on this hurdle.
A good way to think about the problem faced by a firm seeking to address a consumer
with some degree of signal strength is in terms of Kahneman’s (1973) dual-task ap-
proach. Individuals are endowed with a certain mental capacity. How they process
an additional signal depends on the “spare capacity” left after the load imposed by
exposure to other signals. When total signal exposure lies below a certain level,
there is no interference between different signals. Beyond this point, capacity limits
8lead to such interference (see Pashler (1998, p. 162) for a summary of evidence).
Let us denote by τ the total volume of signals to which a consumer is exposed and
let τ0 be the level beyond which interference between signals occurs. While τ is
an endogenous variable (resulting from the firms’ attention-seeking activities, deter-
mined in Section 3), τ0 is an exogenous psychological characteristic reflecting the
limitations of consumer attention.
Signals pass the perceptual filter (the gate) if they are sent at some minimum de-
gree of strength. Let σmin denote the minimum signal strength required for an item
to pass the perceptual filter. The psychological literature discusses two types of
thresholds. First, even in a calm environment with no interference from other sig-
nals, a signal must have a certain absolute strength to be perceived. I normalise this
strength to unity. Thus, σmin = 1 if τ ≤ τ0, such that there is no crowding of sig-
nals. However, if τ > τ0 there is also a relative threshold, for a signal-sending source
must be distinguishable from other sources. “Just noticeable differences” (JNDs)
are a central concept of psychophysics. According to Weber ’s law, “in order for a
change in a stimulus to become just noticeable, a fixed percentage must be added.
In other words, what it takes to make a perceived difference is a relative matter”
(Stevens, 1986, p. 9).5 Formally, if τ > τ0 (i.e., there is interference with signals
from other sources), then σmin rises proportionally with τ . (Setting the factor of
proportionality equal to 1/τ0 guarantees continuity of σmin at τ0.)
5Note that the more controversial Fechner ’s law on the subjective sensation caused by concate-
nating JNDs plays no role in the model of consumer behaviour presented here. The question posed
here is how many items pass the perceptual filter, in other words, how many items are identified
as distinct information sources, not what the receivers feel or how they value signal exposure.
9Summing up, we now have the “gate”:
σmin =


1 if τ ≤ τ0,
τ/τ0 if τ > τ0.
(1)
By sending σmin, an attention-seeking firm acquires one “entry” in the mind of an
addressed consumer.
3. Economic Competition under Limited Attention
Firms seek attention because their participation in economic competition is depen-
dent on their being perceived by buyers. In terms of the model presented in Section
2, firms have to acquire “entries” in the minds of consumers.
Let T = [0, T ] denote the set of firms. Suppose the available technology for dis-
tributing information is such that signals are diffused randomly across the economy
and each firm t ∈ T can reach a mass ρ of consumers. Let R be the total mass of
consumers. The technically feasible range ρ may be smaller or larger than the pop-
ulation size R so that the effective range of a firm is r ≡ min {ρ,R} . According to
Section 2, by sending at strength σmin, a firm acquires one entry in the mind of each
consumer in range r. Firms can acquire more than one entry, which explains why
product differentiation can be successfully used to attract consumer attention. Let
qt denote the number of entries acquired by t ∈ T. For monopolistic competition in
the goods market, this will mean that t is a multi-product firm with qt horizontally
differentiated product variants.
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3.1. Competition for Attention
For a firm to acquire q entries, it must produce and send signal strength σmin for q
different items, where σmin is exogenous to the single firm. This process has costs,
which may be expressed by the function
C(q, σmin) = qA(σmin, a) +B(q) + C0, (2)
where A(·, a), B are increasing, B′′ > 0 and C0 > 0. The separable form simplifies
the analysis.6 It has also the merit of showing the various cost components in a
transparent way. The first term of (2) indicates that each item has to be brought
to the attention of consumers at strength σmin. Cost A rises in the required signal
strength, but no assumption regarding increasing or decreasing marginal costs is
imposed. Parameter a is included to allow for comparative-static analysis. A higher
a means higher costs for producing and distributing σmin. The second term, B,
stands for the costs of advertising differentiated product variants. A firm has to
convince consumers that an additional variant is actually a different product. This
motivates the assumption of rising marginal costs for q. However, it is important to
note that because of fixed costs the average cost of product differentiation declines
up to a certain point and then increases beyond this point. In short, specification (2)
allows in a flexible way for economies and diseconomies of scale in attention-seeking
activities. The fixed cost C0 may (but need not) increase with the mass of addressed
6In the working paper version of this article, an alternative cost specification was considered
(where C is an increasing strictly convex function of the product qσmin). The main findings
regarding the causes of scarcity of attention and its consequences for product diversity are the
same.
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consumers.7 However, there is no spatial structure in the model. Unlike the case of
transportation costs, the distance between sender and receiver matters little when
modern technologies are used to disseminate information.
The cost of attention-seeking is incurred because being present in buyers’ minds is
profitable. Let pi (q) be the profit that a firm can extract from a buyer through q
entries. pi (q) depends on the details of the goods market equilibrium achieved when
a set T of sellers competes for the budgets of a mass of R consumers (see Section
3.3). Anticipating that pi (qt) can be earned from each attracted buyer and having
the capacity to reach r consumers, each t ∈ T chooses
max
qt
Π (qt) ≡ rpi (qt)− C (qt, σmin) , (3)
taking σmin as given.
3.2. Perception Constraint and Diversity
Consumers choose from the set of items that have passed the perceptual filter. Let
the set of items perceived by buyer i be Mi and let Mi denote the size of Mi. As
each t ∈ T brings qt items to the attention of r buyers drawn randomly from a total
mass R, the size of a buyer’s choice set is given by the equation
Mi =
1
R
∫
T
rqtdt ≡M. (4)
7Variations in audience size (r) may not matter because technologies such as the Internet have
global reach. This paper considers r as an exogenous variable. This is certainly true for information
technologies with global range because r is given by the population size. For ρ < r, firms may have
the opportunity to extend the range of their attention-seeking activities by incurring higher fixed
costs C0. The consequences of such an extension of the analysis are straightforward (see proof of
Lemma 2).
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It should be noted that the choice sets Mi of different buyers may overlap but gen-
erally are not identical (despite equal size). Only if each firm reaches all buyers,
that is, if r = R, then all buyers will be aware of the same items. Size M , which
measures the mass of items of which an individual buyer is aware, can be called the
local diversity.
The fact that each item in Mi is brought to the attention of the buyer at strength
σmin implies for the buyer’s total signal exposure that τ = Mσmin. According to
(1), the level of τ is decisive for whether or not an economy is subject to scarcity of
attention. This motivates the following definition:
Definition. If signal exposure τ = Mσmin is greater than τ0, then an economy
is information rich (IR). If τ is smaller than τ0, the economy is information poor
(IP).
Substituting τ = Mσmin for τ into (1), we obtain the following constraints on
an information-poor and information-rich economy, respectively.
Lemma 1.
In an information-poor economy,
M < τ0 and σmin = 1. (5)
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In an information-rich economy,
M = τ0 and σmin > 1. (6)
In the information-poor economy, only the absolute perception threshold σmin = 1
must be passed in order to be part of a buyer’s choice set. Its diversity, M , is de-
termined by the competition between sellers for buyers. Section 4 will describe the
characteristics of equilibrium diversity. In an information-rich economy, the size of
a buyer’s choice set is constrained by his or her limited perceptual capacity (rep-
resented by parameter τ0). The competition between sellers to gain entry into the
limited set of perceived items drives up τ and σmin (see Section 4 for the determi-
nation of equilibrium signal strength).
At the aggregate level, the set of items perceived in the economy is given by the
union S =
⋃
Mi of individual choice sets. Let S denote the size of S. S measures
the number of items an outside observer of the economy would count and can be
called the aggregate diversity. S is equal to the total number of items brought to
the attention of consumers by firms, that is,
S =
∫
T
qtdt. (7)
Comparing (7) with (4), we get
14
S
M
=
R
r
, (8)
which is a measure of the overlap between the consumers’ choice sets. We can
call this measure “distinctiveness”.8 Looking at the two extremes, if distribution
of signals is confined to small neighbourhoods, S
M
approaches infinity. By contrast,
if information technology allows each firm to reach the whole population, we have
S
M
= 1.
3.3. Competition for Money
The items that succeed in capturing buyers’ attention compete for the buyers’ bud-
get in a conventional way. Since firms have to incur a cost for attracting attention,
we have a case of imperfect competition in which firms must earn the profits to
cover this cost. I use the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competi-
tion, in part because of its simplicity. By excluding strategic interaction, the model
becomes a tractable workhorse for analysing the consequences for equilibrium of
limited consumer attention at an aggregate level. Another reason is the focus on
product diversity. The Dixit-Stiglitz approach to monopolistic competition implies
a taste for variety. The use of this model allows the benefits of additional product
variants to be offset against the cost of bringing these additional variants to the at-
tention of consumers. According to Lemma 1, firms’ competition for attention can
increase the diversity enjoyed by consumers when the economy is information poor.
In an information-rich economy, however, this diversity is limited by the consumers’
8Caplan and Cowen (2004) distinguish between “diversity as a menu of choice” and “diversity
of cultural distinctiveness”. Local diversity measures the first aspect, while the second aspect is
related to S
M
.
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capacity to pay attention, so that a firm that wants to attract consumer attention
must “steal” this attention from another firm.9
Each consumer i is endowed with budget y and has CES preferences over the set of
items Mi (s)he is aware of:
U =

∫
Mi
xϕs ds


1/ϕ
, 0 < ϕ < 1. (9)
This implies for each item the demand function
xs =
y
Pi
p−εs , s ∈Mi, (10)
where ε ≡ 1
1−ϕ
> 1 is the elasticity of substitution between items, and Pi ≡
∫
Mi
p1−εs ds
is a price index. Firms sell their products at the monopoly price ps =
εc
ε−1
≡ p,
where c denotes unit production cost. Since prices are identical, a consumer buys
xs =
y
M
ε−1
εc
≡ x of each product variant. Thus, a firm that produces qt variants
extracts operating profits of
pi (qt) = qt (p− c) x = qt
y
Mε
(11)
from each of the r buyers reached by its signals. This is the profit anticipated in
equation (3) regarding the strength at which a firm competes for attention.
9As shown in Section 6, there will always be wasteful advertising in an information-rich economy.
No indirect effects of advertising are considered. For instance, Grossmann (forthcoming) considers
a quality-ladder model of growth in which higher incentives to engage in combative advertising are
accompanied by a rise in quality-improving investments.
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4. Equilibrium Analysis
The model has six variables: the minimum signal strength (σmin) required to bring
a product variant to a consumer’s attention, a consumer’s total signal exposure (τ),
the local and aggregate diversity of perceived variants (M and S, respectively), and
the number of active firms (T ) and product variants per firm (q).
An equilibrium has to satisfy the familiar conditions for profit maximisation and
free entry:
q∗ = argmaxΠ (q) and Π (q∗) = 0, (12)
where Π is given by (3) and (11). The additive cost structure (2) makes it possible
to separate the problem of product differentiation within firms from the rest of the
model. We obtain the following result:
Lemma 2. (i) q∗ is an increasing function of C0. (ii) Average cost C(q
∗, σmin)/q
∗
is given by a function k(σmin, a, C0) increasing in all arguments.
Advertising for different product variants engenders costs. This is a disadvantage
for multi-product firms. However, the fixed cost (C0) implies increasing returns
from attention-seeking that work in favour of product differentiation. Therefore,
the equilibrium number of variants per firm increases along with the fixed costs of
attention-seeking. This is shown in Part (i) of Lemma 2.10 Part (ii) describes the
average expenditure required for attracting consumer attention to a variant. Us-
10According to the proof of Lemma 2, q∗ is implicitly defined by the condition q∗B′(q∗) =
B(q∗)+C0. Thus, q
∗ also depends on the shape of differentiation cost B. However, the properties
of B have no direct effect on other variables in the model.
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ing this expenditure in (3), we can write the zero-profit condition in the following
convenient form:
ry
Mε
= k(σmin, a, C0). (13)
The left side of Equation (13) represents the revenue that can be earned per item.
The profit extracted from a consumer depends on the consumer’s budget and the
elasticity of substitution. The budget is spread over M items, and a mass r of con-
sumers can be reached with the given information technology. The revenue must
cover the cost of bringing an item to the attention of consumers, which is represented
by the right side of Equation (13). The equation defines the zero-profit locus in the
(σmin,M)-space.
Diversity M and strength σmin are given for the single firm. It is profitable to
enter the market at points below the zero-profit curve. However, if more firms
compete for the attention of consumers by advertising their product variants, then
the signal exposure of consumers rises so that the economy may switch from an
information-poor to an information-rich regime. In other words, the familiar eco-
nomic mechanisms implied by profit maximisation and firm entry interact with the
perception constraints defined by Lemma 1. Combining zero-profit condition (13)
with constraints (5) and (6), we obtain the following characterisation of economies
under conditions of limited attention.
Proposition 1. (Scarcity regime). An economy is information rich if
ry
ε
> τ0κ, (14)
18
where κ ≡ k(1, a, C0). If the inequality is reversed, the economy is information poor.
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterise an information-rich econ-
omy with scarcity of attention in terms of fundamentals (κ comprises both the vari-
able and fixed-cost parameters of the information technology.) Condition (14) clearly
highlights why scarcity of attention has become an issue. When advances in informa-
tion technology allow firms to address a larger range of consumers without increasing
costs, or when the cost of sending signals declines, then an information-rich econ-
omy emerges. And if buyers become richer or less price sensitive, an information-rich
economy also becomes more likely. The next proposition characterises equilibrium
in an information-poor economy:
Proposition 2. (Information-poor economy). In an information-poor economy in
equilibrium, M = ry
εκ
and σmin = 1. Moreover, S =
Ry
εκ
and T = Ry
εκq∗
.
In an information-poor economy, total signal exposure is so low that each source
sending at strength 1 is perceived, regardless of what the competition is doing.
Nonetheless, a firm that wants to sell an item has to incur the cost of producing and
distributing σmin = 1 to make the buyer aware of this item. This limits the number of
firms surviving in equilibrium. As a consequence, the diversity of products to which
consumers have access is also limited. In short, the scarce supply of items – not
the limited capacity of attention – determines the diversity perceived locally or in
aggregate. As Proposition 2 shows, aggregate diversity and number of firms increase
with the size of the economy (Ry) and decrease with the cost of information. Local
diversity grows as consumer budgets rise and advances in information technology
are achieved. In particular, for ρ < R (so that r = ρ), local diversity increases if
technical progress allows wider diffusion of signals without excessively raising the
19
costs of generation and distribution of signals.11 In an information-rich economy,
the situation is reversed in a sense, as illustrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (Information-rich economy). In an information-rich economy in
equilibrium, M = τ0 and σmin > 1 is an increasing function of
ry
εκ
. Moreover,
S = Rτ0
r
, T = Rτ0
rq∗
.
The diversity of items perceived by individuals is determined by their scarce atten-
tion capacity – not by a scarce supply of items. If firms are faced with wealthier
consumers, a wider range of consumers or lower information costs, then the incen-
tives to enter into the market increase. This raises the signal strength at which sellers
compete for attention. For the equilibrium signal strength, it is the firm range (r)
rather than the size of population (R) that is important. These do not coincide if
the information technology of a firm only reaches a subset of the population. In this
case, an attention-seeking firm has no reason to change its behaviour in reaction to
an increased population. By contrast, for aggregate diversity S and the equilibrium
number of firms T , the population size relative to firm range matters.
5. Causes and Consequences of an Information-rich Economy
5.1. Causes
Which changes are responsible for the emergence of scarcity of attention as a “new
scarcity problem”? Proposition 1 gives a precise answer in terms of economic fun-
damentals: Excluding the ad hoc explanation that people’s processing capacity τ0
11The term ρ/κ increases along with ρ if dκ
dρ
ρ
κ
< 1, where κ depends on ρ to the extent that
fixed cost C0 is increasing in ρ. Using (A3) from the proof of Lemma 2, we can rewrite κ as
κ = A(1, a)+B′(q∗). Moreover, dq
∗
dC0
= 1
q∗B′′(q∗) . Thus,
dκ
dρ
= B′′(q∗) dq
∗
dC0
dC0
dρ
and dκ
dρ
ρ
κ
= dC0
dρ
ρ
C0
C0
q∗κ
,
where C0
q∗κ
= C0
C(q∗,1) < 1. Hence,
dC0
dρ
ρ
C0
≤ 1 is a sufficient condition for ρ/κ being increasing in ρ.
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has declined, the economic attractiveness of being present in people’s minds must
have increased or the cost of being present there must have declined. According to
(14), an economy is
IP if r
κ
y
ε
< τ0,
IR if r
κ
y
ε
> τ0,
(15)
where IP stands for information poor and IR for information rich. The first compo-
nent, r
κ
, describes the possibilities of attention-seeking: r is the mass of buyers that
a firm can reach, while κ reflects the cost of bringing an additional product variant
to consumers’ attention. The second component, y
ε
, reflects the attractiveness of
attention-seeking: y is the representative buyer’s budget and 1
ε
(
= p−c
c
)
is the profit
margin. Figure 1 illustrates how the interaction of cost and revenue components
determines whether we are in an information-poor or an information-rich economy.
y
ε
IP
IR
I
II II1
ry
κε
= τ0
II2
r
κ
Fig. 1. Boundary to an information-rich economy
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On the one hand, rising per-capita income or an increase in the degree of monopoly
power move the economy upwards towards the boundary of information-richness
(and, thus, scarcity of attention). On the other hand, a rise in firm range or a
decline in information costs also move the economy towards the boundary. The
interaction between the two sides is important. Whereas in Economy I (with rich
buyers and/or a high degree of monopoly) the advances made in information tech-
nology induce a regime shift from IP to IR, the same advances do not turn Economy
II (with lower buyer budgets or a lower degree of monopoly) into an information-
rich economy. (In an analogous way, the effects of changes in consumer wealth or
the profit margins of firms depend on the economy’s initial position.)
With respect to changes in the ranges of firms, two cases must be distinguished.
If the prevailing information technology of firms is based on local or regional me-
dia, the mass of consumers that a firm can address is limited by the range of the
information technology (ρ < R). In this case, advances in information technology
(for instance, new media) are the relevant cause that makes an economy information
rich. IT advances may allow firms to address their (given range of) buyers at a lower
cost or give them access to a wider range of buyers without increasing information
costs excessively. However, if the range of the existing information technology is so
powerful that the whole population can be reached (ρ ≥ R), then the effective range
is determined by population size and range-increasing technical progress has no ef-
fect. In this case, for instance with global information technologies such as satellites
or the Internet, only lower variable or fixed costs for using these technologies or a
growing consumer population will change the opportunities for attention-seeking.
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While advances in IT systems are an obvious source of information richness, the role
of technologies that reach beyond the population of a given economy needs further
discussion, for example because it points to a new aspect of international integration.
If politically and culturally closed countries are opened up, their consumers start to
share information which is distributed through global information technologies. We
might call the reduction in barriers on information “cultural integration” as opposed
to the reduction in trade barriers such as tariffs or transportation costs. To a certain
extent, for instance for many industrialised countries, this aspect of integration may
be more of historical interest. Nonetheless, I think it is worth considering in the
more recent phase of globalisation. For example, former communist countries were
separated from western countries not only by physical barriers but also by severe
restrictions on information flows, including information on goods. Religious and
ethnic traditions can also exclude a population from information. In the following,
I compare two closed economies – H and F – in which the respective populations
have no access to foreign information, with an integrated economy, in which foreign
information sources can be used freely. The information technology of firms is held
fixed in this comparison, in other words, firms’ information costs do not change un-
der conditions of integration. Moreover, as far as the technological possibilities are
concerned, information can cross national borders. In the closed economy, the effec-
tive range of firms is limited by population size so that the economic fundamentals
of attention-seeking are given by the term
Rkyk
κε
, k = H,F. (16)
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Under conditions of international integration we have
min {ρ,RH +RF} yw
κε
, (17)
where yw =
RHyH+RF yF
RH+RF
is the income of the representative agent of the integrated
world.12 If yw ≥ yk, a switch from (16) to (17) shifts the economy outwards in
Figure 1. The possibility of attracting foreign buyers increases the incentives for
attention-seeking. Whether or not this shifts an economy across the boundary into
the information-rich regime depends on the size and richness of the other country.
For example, if in autarky the economy is at point II, then integration with a
small foreign economy leads to II1, which is still information poor. However, inte-
gration with a larger economy shifts the economy to some point II2, thus turning
an information-poor economy without attention scarcity into an information-rich
economy with a scarcity of attention.
5.2. Consequences
In order to discuss the effects of a switch from IP to IR on signal strength and
product diversity, we look at how these vary with ry
κε
. Figure 2 shows the effects for
the case in which effective firm range and technological range coincide (i.e., ρ < R).
12Note that there are no distance-dependent transportation costs in the model so that firm
location does not matter.
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τ0IP IR
σmin
S for constant ρ
S for constant y
κε
M
ρy
κε
Fig. 2. Impact of economic fundamentals on signal strength and diversity
(ρ < R).
If an economy is information poor, then an increase in the incentives for attention-
seeking is fully translated into increased diversity for the individual consumer. By
contrast, in the information-rich economy such an increase intensifies the competi-
tion for attention by raising the signal strength required for an item to be noticed
by buyers. The effects on aggregate diversity depend on the cause of increased
attention-seeking (see broken lines in Figure 2). If consumer budgets expand or
technological advances reduce signal costs while firm range remains constant, then
aggregate diversity increases in an information-poor, and remains constant in an
information-rich economy. “Cultural distinction”, that is, the distinctiveness of in-
dividual choice sets S
M
(= R
ρ
, according to (8)), is not affected by these changes in
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economic fundamentals. By contrast, if increased attention-seeking is induced by
range-increasing technical progress, then aggregate diversity remains constant in IP
and declines in IR.13 Moreover, the extension of firm range leads to a decline in cul-
tural distinction in both regimes. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental difference. In
an information-poor economy, cultural distinction is reduced because an expanding
firm range makes it possible to bring a larger set of items to the attention of an
individual consumer so that local diversity approaches aggregate diversity. In an
information-rich economy, an increase in firm range reduces aggregate diversity so
as to approach the level of local diversity because more consumers are addressed by
the same firms. At the extreme, if each firm covers the whole population, aggregate
diversity coincides with local diversity.
If the effective firm range is limited by population size rather than technology
(ρ > R), international integration is seen to be an important cause of increased
attention-seeking. To see the consequences of international integration, consider
again two economies k = H,F and suppose that an information technology with
global range is available, that is, firms are technically able to cover the populations of
both countries together. In closed economies, institutional constraints restrict firm
range to the domestic population. In the integrated economy, firms can also ad-
dress foreign consumers. This increases signal exposure. The following proposition
summarises the effects of international integration on diversity.
Proposition 4. (International integration and diversity). LetMk, Sk andMI , SI de-
note local and aggregate diversity in the closed and integrated economies, respectively.
13According to Propositions 2 and 3, respectively, S = Ry
εκ
in an information-poor economy and
S = Rτ0
ρ
in an information-rich economy.
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If ρ ≥ RH +RF : (i) Integration with another economy leads to SI =MI > Sk =Mk
if k was information poor before integration and to SI = MI = Sk = Mk if k
was information rich. (ii) If two information-poor economies integrate into an
information-poor world, then SI = SH + SF . In all other cases, SI < SH + SF .
(iii) In any case, Sk
Mk
= SI
MI
< SH+SF
Mk
.
Part (i) confirms that the total number of items supplied in the integrated world
can never be smaller than in a closed economy. Moreover, an individual never loses
in terms of experienced diversity if an economy is integrated with another economy.
Inhabitants of an information-rich closed economy are unaffected because scarcity of
attention limits diversity. Inhabitants of an information-poor economy gain when it
opens up because foreign information sources become available. However, according
to Part (ii), global diversity as seen from the outside is usually lower in the integrated
world than the aggregate sum of items produced in isolated economies. Only if
the world remains information poor after integration is global diversity unaffected
by international integration. Finally, Part (iii) tells us that the distinctiveness of
individual choice sets in the integrated economy is identical to the distinctiveness
observed within the closed economies. However, distinctiveness observed from the
perspective of a world traveller declines if international integration allows firms to
fully exploit global possibilities for dissemination.14
14All the claims of Proposition 4 are made under the assumption that global coverage
(ρ ≥ RH +RF ) is technically feasible. If max {RH , RF } < ρ < RH + RF , the consequences of
integration are more complex. Essentially, we have the following modifications: If ρ is close to
max {RH , RF } and the two economies are relatively heterogeneous with respect to income or pop-
ulation size, then integration of an information-poor economy with an information-rich economy
may lead to an information-poor international economy. Moreover, aggregate diversity and distinc-
tiveness may be increased by integration. And the inhabitants of an economy may lose in terms
of individually perceived items if their economy is integrated with a relatively information-poor
economy.
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5.3. Media Intermediation
The mass media and the Internet are examples of range-increasing progress. This
section addresses an important indirect effect of media intermediation on attention-
seeking. Apart from paid advertisements, media report at their own expense about
people and products. The firms or product variants that are selected for inclusion
in the list of reported items reach a large range of consumers for free. In order to
examine this indirect role, suppose that firms can reach consumers directly within
some local range ρ < R, whereas the media reach the total population. Media neces-
sarily present information in an order – for instance, as a headline or a small notice,
on the front page or on some page further inside. Psychological evidence shows that
media consumers pay attention to salient news. A better rank means more salience.
Thus, apart from the perceptual filter at the individual level discussed above, there
is also a media gate. To make things simple, suppose that media consumers pay
attention to the first n0(< τ0) items and neglect the rest. For instance, Internet
searchers look at the first page of links shown by a search engine in response to
a query. Suppose further that media reporting is impartial in the sense that any
item getting through the perceptual filter (1) within the firms’ direct range has an
equal chance of passing the media gate as well. In other words, firms can do nothing
to influence media reporting in their favour. Formally, the probability that a firm
attains a place in the media is
α = min
{n0
S
, 1
}
, (18)
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where S is the equilibrium measure of aggregate diversity. This implies for a ex-
pected firm range
r = min
{
ρ+
n0
S
(R − ρ) , R
}
(19)
so that expected profit is
EΠ (qt) = rqt
y
εM
− C(qt, σmin), (20)
according to (3) and (11).
Deriving the equilibrium in an analogous way to the analysis in Section 4, we obtain
the following characterisation.15
Proposition 5. (Equilibrium under media intermediation). Let χ ≡ ρy
εκ
and ψ ≡
n0
R−ρ
R
. (i) If Ry
εκ
> n0 and χ + ψ > τ0, then the economy is information rich;
if χ + ψ < τ0, then the economy is information poor. (ii) In an information-
poor economy in equilibrium, M = min {χ + ψ, S} and S = Ry
εκ
. Moreover, r =
min
{
ρ+ εκ
y
ψ,R
}
, where r < R if S > n0. (iii) In an information-rich economy
in equilibrium, M = τ0, S =
R
ρ
(τ0 − ψ) and r =
ρ
1−ψ/τ0
< R. Moreover, σmin is
increasing in χ and ψ.
Parameter ψ sums up the firms’ opportunities to reach consumers beyond direct
range through the media. These opportunities increase the signal exposure of con-
sumers so that an information-rich regime with scarcity of attention is more likely.16
15According to Lemma 2, q∗ is independent of r. Therefore, q∗ and T = S/q∗ are not addressed
in the proposition.
16Ry
εκ
> n0 is an obvious condition for information-richness. IR and τ0 < χ + ψ imply S =
R
ρ
(τ0 − ψ) <
Ry
εκ
. Thus, Ry
εκ
≤ n0 would imply S < n0 < τ0. All items could be regarded in easily
perceived media places and there would be no limitations on information.
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This is shown by Part (i). In an information-poor economy, media reporting in-
creases the diversity of goods of which a consumer is aware. This is shown by
Part (ii). By contrast, according to Part (iii), in an information-rich economy me-
dia reporting reduces aggregate diversity. The items brought to consumer atten-
tion through the media are perceived by all consumers so that, in the aggregate,
less items are in the field of attention of consumers.17 Moreover, the opportunity
to reach consumers through the media induces firms to increase the strength of
attention-seeking.
6. Normative Analysis
This section compares the welfare level achieved in the competitive equilibrium
with the planner solution and discusses policy instruments for implementing a social
optimum.
6.1. Welfare in Competitive Equilibrium
Valuation of diversity is a deep and controversial issue. The following remarks focus
on a narrow economic aspect, but even within this narrow aspect, important caveats
must be kept in mind. First, the discussion is based on a representative agent frame-
work. Second, any possible role for extracting rents from limited attention is ignored
because only free-entry equilibriums with zero profits are considered. Third, only
the effects of attention-seeking on consumer product diversity play a role. The pos-
sibility that advertising manipulates consumer preferences is not considered. Nor
are phenomena like information stress, enjoyment of advertisements or annoyance
17The distinctiveness of choice sets S/M is min
{
R
ρ
χ
χ+ψ , 1
}
if the economy is IP and R
ρ
(1−ψ/τ0)
if the economy is IR.
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about being exposed to attention-grabbing taken into account.
Consumers have a preference for variety, as represented by the utility function (9) de-
fined over the set of items they perceive. Monopolistic competition leads to ps =
εc
ε−1
and xs =
y
M
ε−1
εc
in equilibrium. Thus, U =M
1−ϕ
ϕ
y(ε−1)
εc
for the representative agent’s
utility level. Substituting M from Proposition 2, we have
UP =
( r
κ
) 1−ϕ
ϕ
(y
ε
) 1
ϕ ε− 1
c
(21)
in an information-poor economy. And substitutingM from Proposition 3, we obtain
UR = τ
1−ϕ
ϕ
0
y (ε− 1)
εc
(22)
for the information-rich economy. Comparing UR with UP , we get UP < UR if and
only if yr
εκ
< τ0, which is exactly the condition for an information-poor economy.
Hence,
UP < UR. (23)
Life in an information-rich world is definitely better than life in an information-poor
world. As long as the economy is information poor, larger firm range and lower in-
formation costs increase utility by increasing the diversity of items of which buyers
are aware. If the economy becomes information rich, the diversity effect on utility
is exhausted because scarce attention limits the variety of perceived items.
The above comparison is based on perceived diversity. In an information-rich econ-
omy, a further welfare issue arises that goes beyond the model presented here. In
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the information-poor economy, every agent who has an economically viable idea or
product can participate in the competition for buyers because there is free entry to
the consumers’ minds. By contrast, in the information-rich economy, all available
entries to consumer minds have been exhausted. Faced with many and powerful in-
formation sources, attention necessarily focuses on a subset of sources. Since content
can only be evaluated after an item has passed the perceptual filter, the selection of
this subset cannot be based on content. Therefore, only the measure of the subset
in the field of attention is determined in the considered equilibrium. For welfare,
however, content obviously matters too. For instance, I can read a certain number
of pages (written with standard clarity), but how much I benefit from the reading is
a different question. The problem is that I could have chosen a different set of pages
(of equal size and clarity), but then I wouldn’t have seen the first set. Moreover,
the most interesting pages may not be in the market at all. The analysis of limited
attention as a scarce resource presented here shows that economic competition is
contingent on a perception filter and that the set of perceived items is a subset of the
economically possible items. In an information-rich economy, there is no guarantee
that the perceived items are the best possible items.18
6.2. Planner Solution
A social planner also has to account for the fact that consumer behaviour is restricted
by the perceptual gate (1). Moreover, the financial restriction that earnings must
18Huberman and Wu (2006) point out that Internet search engines that use algorithms based
on number of links or popularity do not guarantee that the top list presented to users will contain
the most valuable information. They propose an algorithm that reflects expected user value more
accurately by accounting for potentially valuable items of information. An important aspect is that
new and unknown items have a chance to show up on the first page, while established items may
“die”.
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cover production as well as information costs has to be satisfied. Suppose that the
planner chooses to inform through T firms about S = qT product variants with
signal strength σmin per variant. Then, the total information costs to be covered are
K ≡ C(q, σmin)T . (24)
The costs can be financed by two instruments: prices and taxes. Each item can be
brought to the attention of r buyers. If a buyer consumes x units of each item (s)he
perceives, and if the price per unit is p, the earnings per item are r (p− c) x. Total
earnings are given by
E ≡ Sr (p− c)x. (25)
The difference E−K has to be balanced by public funds D = E−K. If D < 0, the
social planner imposes on each of the R individuals a lump-sum tax D/R. If D > 0,
a lump-sum transfer D/R is paid to each individual. Thus, disposable individual
income is given by
yn = y + (E −K) /R. (26)
A buyer with preferences (9) and budget yn purchases x = y
n
pM
of each of the M
perceived items and achieves utility level
U =M
1−ϕ
ϕ
yn
p
. (27)
Proposition 6. (Planner solution). Let q∗ be the value characterised by Lemma 2.
A social planner maximising the representative agent’s utility chooses: (i) σmin = 1,
q = q∗. (ii) If ry
εκ
≤ τ0, then optimal local diversity is given by M
∗ = ry
εκ
. (iii) If ry
εκ
>
τ0, then M
∗ = τ0. (iv) Real disposable income is given by y
n/p = [y − κM∗/r] /c and
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the maximal utility level U∗ is invariant with respect to the chosen financial policy
(p,D).
Hence, in an information-poor economy, the competitive equilibrium, characterised
by Proposition 2, is efficient. Signal strength, local and aggregate diversity, firm
number and product variants per firm coincide with the planner solution. Moreover,
UP = U∗. However, in an information-rich economy, the competitive equilibrium,
characterised by Proposition 3, is inefficient. While the values for local and aggregate
diversity as well as the number of firms and variants per firm are the same as in
the planner solution, competition for attention leads to excessive signal strength
σmin > 1 in the competitive equilibrium. As a consequence, we have a welfare loss
U∗ − UR = τ
1−ϕ
ϕ
0
y
εc
(1−
τ0
χ
), (28)
where χ ≡ ry
κε
> τ0 sums up the economic fundamentals that determine the intensity
of attention-seeking in the competitive equilibrium. Equation (28) shows that the
farther the economic fundamentals are beyond the boundary of information-richness
shown in Figure 1, the higher is the welfare loss from competition for limited atten-
tion.
6.3. Implementation of the Planner Solution
In an information-poor economy – with no scarcity of attention – efficiency is
achieved under conditions of laissez faire, whereas intervention is required in the
information-rich economy. According to Proposition 6, the planner is free in the
choice of financial policy. In particular, the price resulting under monopolistic com-
petition is consistent with efficiency. However, the high profit margin implied by
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monopoly prices induces firms to invest in socially wasteful attention-seeking. In
the interests of efficiency, the cost of attention-seeking can be raised by appropriate
policy intervention. The resources saved by keeping signal strength at the efficient
level can be distributed to the consumers. Alternatively, one may intervene in the
product market to bring down profit margins and thus lower the firms’ incentives
for attention-seeking. The following proposition indicates the policy mixes through
which efficiency can be achieved as a decentralised equilibrium in an information-rich
economy.
Proposition 7. (Optimal policy). In an information-rich economy, the planner
solution can be implemented as competitive equilibrium by imposing on attention-
seeking firms a linear tax F = f1qtA(σmin, a)+ f2[B(qt)+C0]+ f3qt and distributing
the revenue to buyers. Efficiency is achieved if the tax rates satisfy the condition
f1A(1, a) + f2
B(q∗) + C0
q∗
+ f3 =
ϑry − κτ0
(1− ϑ)τ0
, (29)
where ϑ = p−c
p
≤ 1
ε
is the price-cost margin allowed in the product market (ϑ = 1
ε
in
the case of no intervention in the product market.)
The proposition shows several possibilities. For instance, setting f1 = f2 = f and
f3 = 0, we have a uniform linear tax on total advertising expenditure. (29) gives for
the optimal tax rate19
f =
ϑry/κ− τ0
(1− ϑ)τ0
. (30)
The optimal tax rate f rises with profit margin ϑ and increases in the fundamentals
that make attention-seeking more attractive – a larger firm range, richer buyer
19Recall from (2) that κ = C(q
∗,1)
q∗
= A(1, a) + B(q
∗)+C0
q∗
. Note that q∗ is not affected by taxes
that implement the planner solution. Thus, κ is also independent of the tax.
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budgets or lower information costs.20
An alternative instrument would be taxation of product differentiation. More specif-
ically, the government could charge firms a fixed fee for each advertised variant. A
fee of
f = max
{
0,
ry/τ0 − κε
ε− 1
}
(31)
guarantees that the planner solution is realised in the monopolistic competition equi-
librium. If ry/τ0 − κε ≤ 0, the economy is information-poor so that no intervention
is needed.21 If ry/τ0 − κε > 0, then the economy is information-rich. According to
(29), for ϑ = 1/ε a tax with f1 = f2 = 0 and fee f3 =
ry/τ0−κε
ε−1
per variant produced
by a firm implements optimal competition for attention.
7. Concluding Remarks
The following factors have been identified as decisive for moving an economy towards
or across the boundary between information-poor and information-rich regimes: (i)
IT advances that allow firms to address a wider range of buyers or lower the cost
of addressing a given range. (ii) An increase in market size, for instance through
international integration, which allows attention-seeking across borders. (iii) The
possibility of expanding attention-seeking from direct interaction to media interme-
diation with global range. In addition to the familiar variables of the monopolistic
competition model, the following variables have been characterised: (i) Equilibrium
diversity in an information-poor and information-rich economy, respectively. In par-
ticular, aggregate diversity (i.e., the total number of product variants produced in
20For a non-negative tax, at least a profit margin of size τ0κ
ry
must be allowed. Otherwise, one
would have to subsidise advertising.
21Since (31) is continous, it doesn’t matter whether we treat the case ry
κǫ
= τ0 as information-rich
or information-poor.
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the economy), local diversity (i.e. the number of variants perceived and consumed
by an individual) and cultural distinction (measuring the overlap of items in the
choice sets of different individuals). (ii) The level of attention-seeking activities. In
particular, the minimal signal strength required to capture the attention of buyers.
Welfare, efficiency and possible policy interventions were also characterised. In an
information-poor economy, individuals gain when advances are made in IT or when
international integration or media intermediation increase the firms’ opportunities
to bring their products to the attention of buyers. As a consequence, welfare in an
information-rich economy is higher than in an information-poor economy. However,
whereas in the information-poor economy decentralised competition leads to an effi-
cient equilibrium, in an information-rich economy there is wasteful competition for
scarce attention. The planner solution can be implemented by imposing a tax on
attention-seeking activities and distributing the raised revenue to the buyers.
The analysis focussed on the following basic aspect. The allocation of given budgets
according to preferences is restricted to the items that pass the perceptual filter.
Therefore, firms have to make consumers aware of the existence of a product. In
this sense, attention-seeking activities have an informative role. However, in the
information-rich economy the strength of attention-seeking goes beyond the simple
message “Here is a product”. The messages get louder and there is crowding. This
may have important psychological effects in addition to those considered so far.
In particular, the literature on persuasive advertising suggests that the strength of
attention-grabbing affects consumer behaviour. This points to several possible ex-
tensions of the analysis presented here.
37
Increased signal exposure could affect consumer behaviour through the elasticity of
substitution between different product variants. As stronger signals leave a deeper
trace in the buyer’s mind, the consumer may find each perceived item less substi-
tutable by other perceived items. This reduces the price elasticity of demand. The
idea that advertising reduces the price elasticity of demand for advertised prod-
ucts has a long tradition22 and finds empirical support in marketing research.23 The
analysis presented in this paper suggests the following feedback effects between price
elasticity (ε) and advertising strength (σmin) in an information-rich economy: Ac-
cording to Proposition 3, signal strength rises when price elasticity is low. Hence,
if stronger advertising lowers price sensitivity, the firm’s incentives to advertise are
reinforced. As a consequence, changes in economic fundamentals that make an econ-
omy more information rich, lead in equilibrium to rising price-cost margins and a
shift of resources to attention-seeking activities.24
Further interesting conclusions can be drawn when the model is embedded in a
two-sector framework. The advertising literature emphasises that advertisements
shift the demand curve – either because they increase the probability that con-
sumers learn of the existence of a product or because the consumers’ willingness to
pay is increased.25 Accounting for such effects in the analysis presented here points
to two possible biases in the equilibrium of an information-rich economy.26 First,
22See the survey by Bagwell (forthcoming).
23For instance, Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985) and Boulding, Lee and Staelin (1994) provide
evidence that increased advertising lowers price sensitivity significantly.
24See Falkinger (2005), the working paper version of this article, for more details.
25The two causes correspond to the notion of informative and persuasive advertising, respectively.
In the taxonomy proposed by Johnson and Myatt (2006), any advertising that shifts demand
outwards is called hype, in contrast to real information changing the shape of the demand curve.
26Falkinger (2005) contains an attempt to extend the analysis to a two-sector framework
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changes in the economic fundamentals that make an economy more information rich
– IT advances, media, international integration – lead to a shift of resources from
sectors in which advertising has little importance towards sectors prone to adver-
tising and product differentiation. Second, if products are brought to consumers’
attention at greater strength, consumers may become more consumption oriented,
and may work harder or save less.
The analysis presented clearly has limitations. While this paper addresses the ques-
tion as to how many items pass the perceptual filter in the case of limited attention,
it is silent on the question as to whether or not the most valuable items are brought
to consumers’ attention. For instance, it could be fruitful to examine equilibrium
under limited attention in an ideal variety approach. Another limitation comes from
the focus on monopolistic competition. This neglects strategic interaction between
firms. It may be worthwhile to consider oligopolistic competition for consumers’ at-
tention and money. Finally, competition for attention is not limited to the consumer
goods market. The analysis of the equilibrium effects of limited attention can be
extended to other markets as well. For instance, firms have to bring their projects
to the attention of financial investors. Analogous to products, only projects that
enter the investors’ minds will obtain funding.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In main text.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Substituting (11) for pi(qt) in (3), we have Π(qt) =
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rqt
y
εM
−C(qt, σmin). Thus, the first-order condition for max
q
Π(q) and the zero-profit
condition Π(q∗) = 0 read:
ry
εM
− [A(σmin, a) +B
′(q∗)] = 0, (A1)
q∗ry
εM
− [q∗A(σmin, a) +B(q
∗) + C0] = 0, (A2)
respectively. (The second-order condition Π′′ < 0 is guaranteed by B′′ > 0.) Com-
bining (A1) and (A2), we get the equation
B(q∗) + C0 − q
∗B′(q∗) = 0, (A3)
which implicitly defines q∗(C0) with
dq∗
dC0
= 1
q∗B′′(q∗)
> 0. (ii) In view of (A1) and
(A2), average cost A(σmin, a)+[B(q
∗)+C0]/q
∗ is equal to marginal cost A(σmin, a)+
B′(q∗), which increases in a and q∗. Moreover, as shown in Part (i), q∗ rises with
C0. QED
Remark: If, in addition to q, firms could also choose range r, we would have a
further first-order condition q
∗y
εM
− dC0
dr
= 0. An interior optimal r∗ results if d
2C0
dr2
> 0.
Suppose, for instance, C0 = c0 +
1
2
r2. Then r∗ = q
∗y
εM
and (A3) takes the form
B(q∗) + c0 +
1
2
(
q∗y
εM
)2
− q∗B′(q∗). Implicit differentiation gives us dq
∗
dc0
> 0. Thus,
dC0/dc0 > 0 and average cost C(q
∗, σmin)/q
∗ = A(σmin, a) + B
′(q∗) is an increasing
function of c0.
Proof of Proposition 1. If ry/ε > τ0k(1, a, C0), then, according to (13), Π(q
∗) > 0
at σmin = 1 and M ≤ τ0. Since k is increasing in σmin, Π(q
∗) = 0 for some
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σmin > 1 and M = τ0. By contrast, if ry/ε < τ0k(1, a, C0), then, for some M <
τ0,Π(q
∗) = 0 at σmin = 1. With this the result follows from Lemma 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. According to Lemma 1, σmin = 1. Substitute this
into (13) to get M . Then S follows from (8) and T from (7) and qt = q
∗. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. According to Lemma 1, M = τ0. Using this in (7)
and (8) we have S and T . Moreover, condition (13) reduces to τ0 =
ry
εk(σmin,a,C0)
,
where ∂k/∂σmin > 0, ∂k/∂a > 0 and ∂k/∂C0 > 0. Thus, σmin rises if and only
if ry
ε
rises or k(·, a, C0) shifts downwards. The latter is equivalent to a decline of
k(1, a, C0). In short, σmin rises at M = τ0 if and only if
ry
εκ
rises. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. Define χk ≡
rkyk
κε
, k = H,F and χI =
min{ρ,RH+RF }yw
κε
.
Assumption ρ ≥ RH +RF implies χI = χH +χF . According to (15), χ < τ0 implies
IP and χ > τ0 implies IR. If I is IP, then H and F are IP since χI = χH + χF < τ0
implies χk < τ0. In this case, according to Proposition 2, SI =MI = χI (= χH + χF )
and Sk = Mk = χk. Note that rk = Rk since ρ ≥ RH + RF . Thus Sk = Mk <
MI = SI = SH+SF . If H and F are IP and I is IR, then, according to Propositions
2 and 3, Mk = Sk = χk < τ0 = MI = SI and SH + SF = χH + χF > τ0. Thus,
Sk =Mk < MI = SI < SH+SF . If H and I are IR, then SH =MH =MI = SI = τ0
and SI = τ0 < SH +SF = τ0 +min {τ0, χF}. This proves the claims in Parts (i) and
(ii). Part (iii) follows from (8) and the fact that ρ ≥ RH+RF implies rk = RH+RF .
Thus, Sk
Mk
= SI
MI
= 1 and SH+SF
Mk
> 1. QED
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose first that the economy is IP. Then, accord-
ing to Proposition 2, S = Ry
εκ
is independent of r. Thus, r = min {ρP , R} with
ρP ≡ ρ +
εκn0
y
R−ρ
R
and M = ry
εκ
= min
{
χ+ ψ, Ry
εκ
}
. This proves Part (ii). More-
over, IP requires M < τ0, which only holds if χ + ψ ≤ τ0 or r = R, i.e., S ≤ n0.
This proves the first claim in Part (i). Suppose next that the economy is IR. Then,
according to Proposition 3, S = Rτ0
r
. Substituting this for S into (19), we get
r = ρ/(1 − n0
τ0
R−ρ
R
), where r < R, since ρ < R − n0
τ0
(R − ρ), which is equivalent
to ρ(1 − n0/τ0) < R(1 − n0/τ0). (The latter inequality reduces to ρ < R since
n0 < τ0.) Substituting r =
ρ
1−ψ/τ0
into S = Rτ0/r gives S =
R
ρ
(τ0 − ψ). Moreover,
ry
εκ
= χ
1−ψ/τ0
is increasing in χ and ψ. According to Proposition 3, σmin rises with
ry
εκ
and thus with χ and ψ. This proves Part (iii). Finally, ry
εκ
> τ0 is equivalent to
χ+ψ > τ0. Thus, according to Proposition 1, IR implies χ+ψ > τ0. If χ+ψ ≤ τ0,
then the economy is IP or at the boundary between IP and IR. In the latter case,
M = ry
εκ
= τ0, S = τ0R/r and r =
ρ
1−ψ/τ
. Thus, ry
εκ
= τ0 if and only if χ + ψ = τ0.
This proves that χ+ ψ < τ0 implies IP – the second claim of Part (i).QED
Proof of Proposition 6. Substituting x = y
n
pM
in (25) and combining the re-
sult with (24) and (26), we obtain
yn =
p
c
[
y −
C (q, σmin)
qr
M
]
, (A4)
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whereMR/r = S from (8) and S = qT from (7) have been used. Thus, the planner’s
problem is
max
σmin,q,M
U =M
1
ϕ
−1
[
y −
C (q, σmin)
qr
M
]
1
c
(A5)
subject to the perception constraints (5) and (6) implied by gating mechanism (1).
∂C/∂σ > 0 and σmin ≥ 1 immediately imply σmin = 1 for optimal signal strength.
And the first-order condition for q coincides with (A3) so that q = q∗, as determined
by Lemma 2. This proves Part (i). Differentiating (A5) with respect to M , we get
the first-order condition
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
M
1
ϕ
−2
[
y − C
qr
M
]
−M
1
ϕ
−1 C
qr
= 0, which reduces
to
M
1
ϕ
−2
[(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
y −
1
ϕ
C
qr
M
]
= 0. (A6)
This gives us
M∗ = min
{
(1− ϕ) y
qr
C(q∗, 1)
, τ0
}
(A7)
sinceM ≤ τ0 according to (5), (6). The second-order condition reads
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)(
1
ϕ
− 2
)
M
1
ϕ
−3
(
y − C
qr
M
)
−2
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
M
1
ϕ
−2 C
qr
< 0, which is equivalent to (1− 2ϕ)
(
y −M C
qr
)
<
2ϕM C
qr
. This inequality reduces to (1− 2ϕ) y qr
C
< M , which certainly holds
at M , as determined by (A6). This, q = q∗, 1 − ϕ = 1/ε and the fact that
κ = k(1, a, C0) =
C(q∗,1)
q∗
prove Part (ii) and Part (iii). Part (iv) follows imme-
diately from (A4) and (27). QED
Proof of Proposition 7. Using x = y
n
pM
and pi(qt) = qtr(p − c)x, we get for
the gross profit of a firm bringing qt items to the attention of r buyers: rqtϑy
n/M,
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where ϑ ≡ (p− c) /p. Thus, net profits for a firm facing σmin and tax F , are given
by Π (qt) = rqtϑy
n/M − C(qt, σmin)− F . Instead of (A1), (A2) we get
rϑyn
M
− [(1 + f1)A(σmin, a) + (1 + f2)B
′(q) + f3] = 0 (A8)
qrϑyn
M
− q
[
(1 + f1)A(σmin, a) + (1 + f2)
B(q) + C0
q
+ f3
]
= 0 (A9)
for the first-order and zero-profit conditions, respectively. Eliminating rϑyn/M , we
obtain B′(q) = [B(q)+C0]/q = 0, which is identical to equation (A3). Thus, qt = q
∗,
as defined by Lemma 2 (and is efficient according to Proposition 6). Distributing
the resulting tax revenue TF to the R buyers, we have net income yn = y+ FT/R,
which with T = S/q = MR
rq
gives yn = y +
M
r
[f1A(σmin, a) + f2
B(q)+C0
q
+ f3]. Under
(29), this reduces to yn = y +
M
r
{
f1[A(σmin, a)−A(1, a)] +
ϑry−κτ0
(1−ϑ)τ0
}
, which can be
rewritten in the form
yn = y
1 + ϑ(M − τ0)/τ0
1− ϑ
−
Mκ
r(1− ϑ)
+
M
r
f1∆A, (A10)
where ∆A ≡ A(σmin, a)−A(1, a). Using this in (A9), the zero-profit condition under
the tax satisfying (29) reads: ϑry
M(1−ϑ)
[1 + (M−τ0)ϑ
τ0
] − ϑκ
1−ϑ
+ ϑf1∆A − [A(σmin, a) +
B(q)+C0
q
+ f1∆A +
ϑry−κτ0
(1−ϑ)τ0
] = 0. Collecting terms and using A(σmin, a) +
B(q)+C0
q
=
κ+∆A, this equation reduces to
ϑry
(1− ϑ)
(
1
M
−
1
τ0
) +
ϑ2ry
M(1− ϑ)τ0
(M − τ0) = (1 + f1 − ϑf1)∆A. (A11)
Together with the perception constraints (5) and (6), equation (A11) implies σmin =
1 and M = τ0. To see this, first suppose that σmin > 1. Then, according to (6),
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M = τ0 and (A11) reduces to (1+f1−ϑf1)∆A = 0, which implies ∆A = 0 and thus
σmin = 1. (Note that 1 + f1 − ϑf1 > 0, since ϑ < 1 and f1 ≥ 0.) Suppose next that
M < τ0. Then, according to (5), σmin = 1 and thus ∆A = 0 so that (A11) reduces
to 1
M
− 1
τ0
+ ϑ
Mτ0
(M − τ0) = 0, which is equivalent to τ0 −M = ϑ(M − τ0). Since
ϑ < 1, this implies M = τ0. Summing up, σmin = 1 and M = τ0 in a zero-profit
equilibrium under tax (29). Finally, with σmin = 1 and M = τ0, net income (A10)
reduces to yn =
y−τ0κ/r
1−ϑ
, which coincides with the planner solution of Proposition 6
since 1− ϑ = c/p by definition. QED
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